The Rise of Cyber Warfare in Global Politics
Article No: 3498
Category: Cyber Security
Author: Ömer Akın | Founder and Strategic Intelligence Director, Quantum Intelligence Hub (QIH)
The definition of war has changed. This change did not come suddenly, but it happened without most people noticing. The advance of tanks, the deployment of naval forces, and aerial bombardment; these traditional images of conflict are giving way to a silent, invisible, and borderless form of warfare. Cyber warfare is no longer a science fiction scenario, but a real component of today’s geopolitics. And this reality is fundamentally reshaping global power balances, national security doctrines, and corporate risk strategies.
As Ömer Akın, during the years I have spent in the fields of cyber security and digital intelligence, I have closely observed cyber warfare moving from theory to practice, and states building both offensive and defensive capacities in this new front in a competitive manner. The intelligence and security consultancy work we carry out within Quantum Intelligence Hub (QIH) provides us with a perspective that allows us to analyze this transformation at an academic level and manage it at a corporate level.
In this article, I will comprehensively address the conceptual framework of cyber warfare, its historical development, its reflections on global politics, and what this new battlefield means for institutions and states in all its dimensions. I aim not only to inform the reader but also to make them feel the real weight of this issue; because cyber warfare is no longer just a matter for security experts, but a phenomenon that every decision-maker must understand.
What is Cyber Warfare: The Boundaries and Debates of the Concept
The concept of cyber warfare still faces a controversial definitional problem in both academic and policy worlds. While some consider any state-sponsored cyber attack within the scope of cyber warfare, others limit this definition only to cyber operations that cause physical damage or cross the threshold of armed conflict. This debate has important practical consequences; because whether an action is classified as cyber warfare directly determines whether the right to self-defense can be exercised under international law and the form of diplomatic responses.
As Ömer Akın, I find it more accurate to approach cyber warfare within the following framework: Cyber warfare is the entirety of coordinated cyber operations carried out by a state or actors acting on behalf of a state against another state’s or critical infrastructure’s digital systems with the aim of causing damage, rendering them dysfunctional, stealing data, or creating psychological impact. This definition includes both attacks that cause direct physical damage and intelligence operations that produce long-term strategic effects.
As an organization that regularly analyzes this field at QIH, I can say this clearly: The boundaries between cyber warfare, cyber espionage, cyber sabotage, and cybercrime are deliberately blurred. This ambiguity allows attackers to maintain a wide corridor of deniability and makes it difficult for the international community to develop a coordinated response. Therefore, understanding cyber warfare also means understanding this intentional uncertainty.
Historical Turning Points of Cyber Warfare
When narrating the history of cyber warfare, rather than presenting a mere chronological list, it is much more illuminating to focus on the breaking points that shaped this history. As Ömer Akın, I evaluate these turning points within both their technical and geopolitical contexts.
The first major breaking point is the coordinated cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007. Triggered by the removal of a pro-Russian monument, these attacks paralyzed the digital infrastructure of a NATO member state for weeks. Banking systems, government websites, and media organizations were targeted simultaneously. This event revealed for the first time so clearly that cyber warfare could be used as a state-organized tool. In QIH’s analysis of this case, as Ömer Akın, the point that caught my attention most was the strategic design of the attacks, which simultaneously accounted for both technical and psychological impact.
The second major breaking point is the Stuxnet malware that emerged in 2010. Targeting Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities, this software proved that cyber weapons could create concrete damage in the physical world. Stuxnet, which physically destroyed uranium enrichment centrifuges, showed that cyber operations could produce results comparable to traditional sabotage methods. From this point on, cyber weapons became a permanent component of states’ national security toolkits. When Ömer Akın and the QIH team examined this case, we assessed that Stuxnet was not only a technical weapon but a highly sophisticated strategic message.
The third critical turning point is the cyber operations carried out against the US electoral process in 2016. These operations clearly revealed that cyber warfare is no longer limited to infrastructure sabotage or data theft; it can target democratic processes, public perception, and societal trust. Disinformation, phishing attacks, and leaked documents constituted the different tools of this operation. As Ömer Akın, I summarize the deepest impact of this event on global politics as follows: When cyber warfare gained a dimension that threatens electoral systems and democratic legitimacy, it entered the agenda not only of defense ministers but of all state institutions and civil society.
The fourth breaking point is the SolarWinds supply chain attack in 2020. This case showed that cyber warfare can now be carried out not by attacking a direct target but through trusted interconnections. Infiltrating a software update used by thousands of organizations, this attack is considered one of the most comprehensive cyber espionage operations in history in terms of both scale and difficulty of detection. The main lesson we at QIH drew from this case was: The weakest link in the security chain is no longer the organization’s own infrastructure, but the third parties integrated with that infrastructure.
The Place of Cyber Warfare in Global Power Competition
When evaluating cyber warfare from a global politics perspective, focusing on its place in great power competition is inevitable. As Ömer Akın, I address this analysis through three main dimensions.
The first dimension is the issue of deterrence. In conventional warfare, nuclear deterrence functioned on the basis of mutual destruction fear. In the cyber domain, deterrence poses a much more complex problem. The difficulty of attribution, that is, the difficulty of proving the source of an attack with technical evidence, fundamentally undermines deterrence. An attacker can disable the deterrence mechanism by hiding its identity or acting through another actor. In QIH’s threat intelligence work, as Ömer Akın, we regularly address this problem; attribution capacity forms the technical infrastructure of cyber deterrence, and strengthening this capacity continues to be a critical priority for global security.
The second dimension is the issue of asymmetric advantage. Cyber warfare has the potential to partially overturn the traditional military power balance. A state or actor with relatively limited resources can inflict disproportionate damage on a much larger rival with a sophisticated cyber operation. This asymmetry is changing the rules of global power competition. While small states can obtain a balancing tool against major powers by developing cyber capacity, major powers use cyber superiority as a tool of strategic pressure.
The third dimension is the issue of normative vacuum. The international legal frameworks governing land, sea, and air warfare are products of decades of experience and negotiation processes. In the cyber domain, international norms are still in their infancy. Although the UN Group of Governmental Experts and academic initiatives such as the Tallinn Manual are important steps, a binding international law of cyber conflict is still under construction. As Ömer Akın and QIH, we argue that filling this normative vacuum is one of the most critical priorities for global cyber security and we closely follow developments in this area.
The Threat of Cyber Warfare to Critical Infrastructure
One of the most dangerous dimensions of cyber warfare in global politics is its capacity to target critical infrastructure systems. Energy grids, water treatment plants, financial systems, transportation networks, and health infrastructure; these systems, which form the indispensable backbone of modern societies, have become extremely sensitive targets for cyber attacks.
The ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, the largest fuel pipeline operator in the US, in 2021, strikingly revealed how fragile critical infrastructure security can be. The system being offline for days led to a fuel crisis and panic buying wave in the Southeastern US. Although this attack was assessed to have been carried out not by a state directly but by a cybercrime group, the incident served as a strong example that state-sponsored actors could use the same tools for a larger strategic purpose.
As Ömer Akın, when I address critical infrastructure attacks from a global politics perspective, I would like to emphasize that these attacks are not limited to technical damage only. Targeting a country’s electricity grid simultaneously undermines that country’s defense capacity, economic functioning, and public trust in the state. This multidimensional impact elevates critical infrastructure attacks to a strategic weight comparable to conventional armed attacks. When conducting critical infrastructure security assessments at QIH, under the leadership of Ömer Akın, we adopt precisely this integrated impact perspective.
Cyber Operations in the Context of Hybrid Warfare
Today, cyber warfare mostly appears not as an isolated form of conflict but as an integral component of hybrid warfare. The hybrid warfare model, in which physical military action, economic pressure, disinformation campaigns, and cyber operations are used in a coordinated manner, creates a structure that is difficult both to analyze and to defend against.
As Ömer Akın, when examining the cyber dimension of hybrid warfare, I would like to draw attention to two critical features. First, cyber operations function in hybrid warfare in both preparation and execution phases. Before a physical operation begins, intelligence is gathered on the target country’s defense systems, communication infrastructure, and decision-making mechanisms; when the operation begins, these systems are attempted to be disabled simultaneously with cyber attacks. Second, in hybrid warfare, cyber operations also have a strong psychological dimension. Coordinated attacks on a society’s digital infrastructure aim to create a sense of chaos and helplessness to weaken resistance capacity.
In strategic threat assessments conducted within QIH, under the leadership of Ömer Akın, we keep this hybrid dimension constantly on the agenda. In the security consultancy we provide to our corporate clients, we also systematically address not only technical cyber threats but also the broader geopolitical and strategic context of these threats.
States’ Cyber Capacity Race
Today, it is estimated that more than thirty states worldwide have developed active cyber offensive capacity. This capacity race shares both similarities and important differences with traditional arms races.
The similarity is this: In both races, parties invest resources to balance or outpace rivals, and this process leads to a cyclical escalation. The difference comes from this: Unlike conventional weapons, cyber capacities can be largely kept secret. While it is almost impossible to completely hide a country’s nuclear capacity, cyber operation capacity can be developed and used in a much more covert manner.
As Ömer Akın, when I evaluate this race from a global security perspective, the development I find particularly concerning is the increasingly blurred relationship between private cyber mercenaries and cybercrime groups and states. Some states create a deniability space by conducting their own cyber operations through private groups or criminal organizations, and also benefit from the technical capacity of these groups. In QIH’s threat intelligence work, we continuously monitor this hybrid actor structure and warn our corporate clients against the risks arising from this structure.
The United States, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Israel are among the countries most analyzed in terms of global cyber power capacity. Each of these countries’ cyber doctrines, targeting criteria, and operational capacities differ significantly from one another. The critical point I want to emphasize as Ömer Akın is this: Institutions and states that understand these differences can tailor their defense strategies to the specific threat actors they face. This customization capacity produces much more effective results compared to a general-purpose defense approach.
Cyber Security Alliances and Multilateral Cooperation
An effective defense against cyber warfare requires a much broader cooperation framework than the capacity a single state or institution can develop alone. This reality has paved the way for the rapid proliferation of multilateral cyber security cooperation mechanisms in recent years.
NATO’s inclusion of cyber defense within the scope of collective defense, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance’s cyber threat sharing networks, the European Union’s coordination mechanisms within ENISA, and bilateral cyber security agreements constitute concrete examples of this multilateral structure. As Ömer Akın and QIH, we both research these alliance structures and, in our corporate consultancy processes, evaluate with institutions how to benefit from the private sector extensions of these structures.
However, these alliance structures also have serious limitations. Conflicts of interest regarding threat intelligence sharing, national security interests, and resource sharing are the biggest obstacles to multilateral cyber security cooperation. Especially in situations requiring alliance members to develop a coordinated response to a cyber attack, disagreements on attribution and political calculations can weaken this coordination.
The Corporate Dimension of Cyber Warfare: Non-State Targets
Cyber warfare does not only take place between states. Private sector institutions, civil society organizations, and individuals can also become both targets and sometimes unwitting actors of this war. As Ömer Akın, I place this dimension at the center of the consultancy work QIH provides to its corporate clients.
Private companies operating critical infrastructure, especially in energy, finance, and telecommunications, can be direct national security targets. Large technology companies are continuously among the institutions targeted by state-sponsored actors to discover and analyze advanced malware and zero-day vulnerabilities. Small and medium-sized enterprises in the defense industry supply chain are at the forefront of the most vulnerable group targeted as an access gateway to large defense companies.
In the consultancy work conducted under the leadership of Ömer Akın within QIH, while addressing this corporate dimension, I constantly emphasize the following: When an institution becomes the target of a state-level threat actor, most traditional cyber security controls become insufficient. Therefore, intelligence on state-sponsored threat actors must be an integral part of the defense strategy. QIH provides both threat intelligence and strategic consultancy services to its institutions in this regard and does not leave them alone in this complex threat environment.
Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Cyber Warfare
The most critical variable that will determine the course of cyber warfare in the coming period is the integration of artificial intelligence into this field. As Ömer Akın, I address the new dimensions AI brings to cyber warfare from two perspectives: its contribution to offensive capacity and its contribution to defensive capacity.
From an offensive perspective, AI dramatically increases both the speed and scale of attacks. Highly customized phishing content produced with large language models, automated vulnerability discovery systems, and malware that adapts to evade traditional security tools in target networks; QIH’s threat intelligence work regularly confirms that these tools are actively deployed today.
From a defensive perspective, AI enables security analysts to analyze petabyte-scale data in real time, flag anomalous patterns with a sensitivity the human eye cannot catch, and automate threat response processes. As Ömer Akın, we actively develop this defensive contribution of AI both theoretically and practically in our work within QIH.
However, the outcome of this race remains uncertain. Which side will gain superiority in the AI arms race largely depends on which side adopts this technology faster, more effectively, and more responsibly. As Ömer Akın and QIH, we will continue to closely monitor this race and resolutely prepare our institutions on both offensive and defensive dimensions.
National and Corporate Defense Strategy Against Cyber Warfare
An effective defense strategy against cyber warfare cannot be sufficient alone at either the national or corporate level. The coordinated operation of these two levels is the fundamental condition for creating a truly resilient defense ecosystem against hybrid and multi-layered threats.
At the national level, an effective cyber defense strategy must include four main components. First, ensuring centralized cyber security coordination. Fragmented institutional responsibilities and lack of coordination constitute one of the biggest weaknesses of national cyber defense. Second, establishing public-private sector cooperation mechanisms covering critical infrastructure owners. Since the vast majority of critical infrastructure is operated by the private sector, national defense remains incomplete without this cooperation. Third, circulating cyber threat intelligence among institutions through real-time sharing mechanisms. Fourth, adopting a long-term investment strategy for the continuous development of both cyber offensive and defensive capacity.
At the corporate level, the approach I advocate as Ömer Akın in QIH’s consultancy processes is this: For institutions to be resilient against state-sponsored threat actors, they need not only technical controls but an intelligence-driven security approach. Who can target you, what methods do these actors use, where are your systems’ most valuable and most vulnerable points; the answers to these questions must form the core of the corporate security strategy.
Conclusion: Confronting the Enduring Reality of Cyber Warfare
Cyber warfare is not a temporary trend, but a permanent reality of global politics. As digitalization deepens, connectivity increases, and the dependence of critical systems on digital infrastructure intensifies, both the strategic importance and destructive potential of cyber warfare will continue to increase.
As Ömer Akın, I think that confronting this reality first requires a mental transformation. Seeing cyber warfare not only as a technical problem but as a multi-layered strategic issue with geopolitical, economic, social, and legal dimensions is a prerequisite for both states and institutions to make accurate decisions in this area. As QIH, we place this multidimensional perspective at the center of every consultancy relationship, every threat analysis, and every security strategy discussion.
Being prepared for cyber warfare does not mean waiting for an attack to happen. Understanding threat actors, anticipating possible attack vectors, continuously updating defense capacity, and knowing in advance what to do when an attack occurs; this is the preparation that Quantum Intelligence Hub, under the leadership of Ömer Akın, strives to build together with institutions. This preparation is the strongest foundation of corporate and national security in the digital age.
About the Author
Ömer Akın is an international strategist and corporate consultant specializing in cyber security, digital intelligence, global trade, and digital operations management. As the founder and Strategic Intelligence Director of Quantum Intelligence Hub (QIH), Ömer Akın provides cyber warfare analysis, threat intelligence, and corporate security consultancy services in the international arena with operations based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The articles and analyses he has written on cyber warfare in global politics, state-sponsored threat actors, and corporate security strategy are used as reference sources by decision makers, security professionals, and academics in the field.
For more information and corporate consultancy:
qihhub.com | qihnetwork.com | omerakin.nl
Ömer Akın
Founder and Strategic Intelligence Director
Quantum Intelligence Hub Ltd (QIH)
qihhub.com | qihnetwork.com | qihhub.info